HBR's 10 Must Reads on Strategy
HBR's 10 Must Reads on Strategy
Harvard Business Review
IN
ESSENCE, THE JOB of the strategist is to understand and cope with
competition. Often, however, managers define competition too narrowly,
as if it occurred only among today’s direct competitors. Yet competition
for profits goes beyond established industry rivals to include four
other competitive forces as well: customers, suppliers, potential
entrants, and substitute products. The extended rivalry that results
from all five forces defines an industry’s structure and shapes the
nature of competitive interaction within an industry.
A
substitute performs the same or a similar function as an industry’s
product by a different means. Videoconferencing is a substitute for
travel. Plastic is a substitute for aluminum. E-mail is a substitute for
express mail. Sometimes, the threat of substitution is downstream or
indirect, when a substitute replaces a buyer industry’s product. For
example, lawn-care products and services are threatened when multifamily
homes in urban areas substitute for single-family homes in the suburbs.
Software sold to agents is threatened when airline and travel websites
substitute for travel agents.
We
shall not cease from exploration/And the end of all our exploring/Will
be to arrive where we started/And know the place for the first time.
—T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets
Truly
great companies understand the difference between what should never
change and what should be open for change, between what is genuinely
sacred and what is not. This rare ability to manage continuity and
change—requiring a consciously practiced discipline—is closely linked to
the ability to develop a vision. Vision provides guidance about what
core to preserve and what future to stimulate progress toward
A
well-conceived vision consists of two major components: core ideology
and envisioned future. (See the exhibit “Articulating a vision.”) Core
ideology, the yin in our scheme, defines what we stand for and why we
exist. Yin is unchanging and complements yang, the envisioned future.
The envisioned future is what we aspire to become, to achieve, to
create—something that will require significant change and progress to
attain.
[About
the iPod] Apple did something far smarter than take a good technology
and wrap it in a snazzy design. It took a good technology and wrapped it
in a great business model. Apple’s true innovation was to make
downloading digital music easy and convenient. To do that, the company
built a groundbreaking business model that combined hardware, software,
and service.
To determine whether your firm should alter its business model, Johnson, Christensen, and Kagermann advise these steps:
- Articulate what makes your existing model successful. For example, what customer problem does it solve? How does it make money for your firm?
- Watch for signals that your model needs changing, such as tough new competitors on the horizon.
- Decide whether reinventing your model is worth the effort. The answer’s yes only if the new model changes the industry or market.
Execution
is the result of thousands of decisions made every day by employees
acting according to the information they have and their own
self-interest. In our work helping more than 250 companies learn to
execute more effectively, we’ve identified four fundamental building
blocks executives can use to influence those actions—clarifying decision
rights, designing information flows, aligning motivators, and making
changes to structure. (For simplicity’s sake we refer to them as
decision rights, information, motivators, and structure.)
Research
by Neilson, Martin, and Powers shows that execution exemplars focus
their efforts on two levers far more powerful than structural change:
- Clarifying decision rights—for instance, specifying who “owns” each decision and who must provide input
- Ensuring information flows where it’s needed—such as promoting managers laterally so they build networks needed for the cross-unit collaboration critical to a new strategy
Tackle
decision rights and information flows first, and only then alter
organizational structures and realign incentives to support those moves.
"Everyone has a good idea of the decisions and actions for which he or she is responsible"
In
companies strong on execution, 71% of individuals agree with this
statement; that figure drops to 32% in organizations weak on execution.
Blurring
of decision rights tends to occur as a company matures. Young
organizations are generally too busy getting things done to define roles
and responsibilities clearly at the outset. And why should they? In a
small company, it’s not so difficult to know what other people are up
to. So for a time, things work out well enough. As the company grows,
however, executives come and go, bringing in with them and taking away
different expectations, and over time the approval process gets ever
more convoluted and murky. It becomes increasingly unclear where one
person’s accountability begins and another’s ends.
When
a company fails to execute its strategy, the first thing managers often
think to do is restructure. But our research shows that the
fundamentals of good execution start with clarifying decision rights and
making sure information flows where it needs to go. If you get those
right, the correct structure and motivators often become obvious.
[screenshot]
Ironically,
the way to ensure that the right information flowed to headquarters was
to make sure the right decisions were made much further down the
organization. By delegating operational responsibility to the people
closer to the action, top executives were free to focus on more global
strategic issues.
From
our survey research drawn from more than 26,000 people in 31 companies,
we have distilled the traits that make organizations effective at
implementing strategy. Here they are, in order of importance.
In
our work, we often see evidence of what we call the 80-100 rule: you’re
better off with a strategy that is 80% right and 100% implemented than
one






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